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THE LUBBOCK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
THE NEW DEAL, AND THE ROPESVILLE 
RESETTLEMENT PROJECT 
WILLIAM eLA YSON 
US Highway 62 crosses the town of Ropes-
ville, population 480, between Lubbock and 
Brownfield on the South Plains of Texas. To 
the north and west of town, scattered among 
the suburban-style homes of contemporary 
farmers, stand several dozen small cottages of 
identical design. Some are still occupied, many 
nothing more than ruins, and a few have been 
added on to, stuccoed, or provided a screened 
porch. All are surrounded by cotton fields and 
most are accompanied by ramshackle outbuild-
ings, rusted tractors, dormant windmills, and 
William Clayson is a doctoral candidate in history at 
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sealed irrigation wells. These farmsteads are 
the remains of a rural community project con-
structed by the federal government during the 
Great Depression for the resettlement of 
seventy-six impoverished farm families. The 
Ropesville Project was one of ninety-nine that 
were planned and built by the New Deal's con-
troversial community building program. These 
communities were initiated during the early 
stages of the New Deal by the Division of Sub-
sistence Homesteads of the Department of the 
Interior, then taken over by the Rural Reha-
bilitation Division of the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA). In 1935, the 
two agencies were transferred to the Resettle-
ment Administration (RA) which was replaced 
by the Farm Security Administration (FSA) 
in 1937.1 These programs, founded on a vari-
ety of social and economic theories and ideals, 
were all based on the belief that rational plan-
ning could guarantee a humane, democratic, 
and egalitarian way of life on the land. While 
the history of the Ropesville Project reveals 
much about the community building program, 
life as a resettlement client, and the long term 
effects of New Deal social planning, the paper 
that follows is primarily concerned with the 
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project's beginnings-particularly the involve-
ment of the Lubbock Chamber of Commerce 
in its initial development. This story exposes 
a hidden interaction between the ideals of the 
New Deal community program, the ambitions 
of elites on the local level, and the realities of 
farming on the South Plains. 
The resettlement community building pro-
gram was the most ambitious and controver-
sial effort launched by the New Deal to 
rehabilitate the rural poor. The communities 
were to provide settlers with a lifestyle few 
American farmers had experienced, including 
homes with modern plumbing and electricity; 
freedom from the constant threat of eviction 
because of market vagaries or climate; finan-
cial security for the future; and educational 
and cultural facilities as an integral part of 
community life. 
Although the New Deal community pro-
gram is commonly associated with radical 
left-wing economist Rexford Tugwell and his 
Resettlement Administration, the concept for 
rural resettlement communities was proposed 
by agricultural economist M.L. Wilson of 
Montana State College. His plan called for 
"subsistence homestead" communities, in 
which settlers would grow food on small plots 
of land while they earned wages in decentral-
ized rural industries. Residents of such subsis-
tence communities would not add to the 
surpluses of commercial agriculture markets, 
but would have the means to feed themselves 
in economic downturns. The plan would also 
secure for them a part of the vanishing rural 
lifestyle that Wilson admired. 2 
The plan seemed communistic to local and 
congressional conservatives. For every sup-
porter, there was an opponent who doubted 
industry could be lured to the countryside. 
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads of 
the Department of the Interior, established by 
executive order in August of 1933 with Wil-
son as chief, drew criticism because of high 
costs and the federal government's strict con-
trol over the development of the communi-
ties. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes 
insisted local control would invite graft while 
his opponents felt that local control offered 
flexibility. An alternative to tight federal con-
trol was offered by the Division of Rural Reha-
bilitation of the FERA in 1934.3 The FERA's 
rural rehabilitation plan was to be adminis-
tered on the state level by corporations man-
aged by a board of directors comprised of 
prominent agriculturalists, educators, and busi-
nessmen. Most of the funds were earmarked 
for direct loans to individual farmers, but the 
construction of "rural-industrial" resettlement 
communities in drought areas, the cut-over 
regions of the Great Lakes, and the coal min-
ing regions of the Appalachians and Ozarks 
was a small, but significant, part of the FERA's 
program.4 
The FERA's plan was similar to the subsis-
tence homesteads concept except rural indus-
trial communities would balance cooperative 
farming and.cooperative industry. Small fam-
ily plots for subsistence would combine with 
wage work on large-scale communal farms and 
cooperative industrial enterprises. FERA com-
munities were less expensive than their prede-
cessors because resettlement clients themselves 
built homes and community buildings.s Ac-
cording to Lawrence Westbrook, FERA ad-
ministrator in Texas and later assistant to 
director Harry Hopkins, the FERA projects 
were to be modeled on the "closely knit com-
munities which were established by North 
European and Scandinavian colonists accord-
ing to the European farm village system" be-
cause these immigrants seemed able to take 
care of themselves without having to go on 
relief. Westbrook believed homes, health and 
sanitation facilities, recreational and educa-
tional opportunities, and assistance in estab-
lishing community industrial enterprises 
would, in the long run, cost less than direct 
relief payments.6 
Texas Rural Communities, Incorporated, 
the agency responsible for distributing FERA 
funds in Texas, announced a "rural coloniza-
tion plan" in early February 1934.7 According 
to A.B. Davis, manager of the Lubbock Cham-
ber of Commerce, chamber members "were 
convinced that the idea was ... one of the few 
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FIG. 1. Typical homestead on Ropesville Project, 1936. Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas Tech 
University, Lubbock, Texas. Photo collection #61. 
worthwhile proposed experiments in the New 
Deal ... that had been thought of that would 
actually rehabilitate humans instead of dop-
ing them with the dole."8 The FERA's 
rural-industrial communities plan might solve 
the problem the South Plains had-how to 
develop about five million acres of unplowed 
arable virgin land.9 
The South Plains in the early thirties 
showed a stronger resemblance to the cattle 
kingdom it had been than the cotton kingdom 
it was slowly becoming. Less than half a cen-
tury had passed since the Comanches and the 
great buffalo herds had been driven from the 
region and there were still a few old cowboys 
around to tell about the land before fences, 
roads, or towns. Except for the oil that lay 
largely untapped beneath the buffalo grass and 
mesquite, the only natural resource the Llano 
Estacado had to offer potential settlers was 
land. By the beginning of the Depression, the 
vast majority of this land remained unplowed 
and the relatively few pioneer families that 
were farming on the South Plains in 1930 had 
migrated to the region during the teens and 
twenties. In Lubbock County, the most popu-
lous of all South Plains counties, farms in-
creased from 208 in 1910 to 2495 in 1930, 
while improved acres increased from 838 to 
370,512. 10 Although this rapid rise in agricul-
tural development was accompanied by a rise 
in the population as a whole, the region main-
tained a frontier character well into the twen-
tieth century. As late as 1940, horses remained 
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FIG. 2. Hired tractor operator cultivating, undated . Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas Tech University, 
Lubbock, Texas. Photo collection #61. 
a common mode of transportation, and many 
families still lived in sod dugouts without 
plumbing or electricity. 
Agricultural development came late to the 
South Plains primarily because of the area's 
unpredictable weather. Like the rest of the 
region between the ninety-eighth meridian 
and the Rockies, the South Plains is semiarid, 
neither "halfway between humid and arid, [nor] 
half dry or half wet," and in some years "wet or 
dry at wrong times from the standpoint of ag-
ricultural productions and yields." Carl 
Kraenzel called the unpredictable precipita-
tion on the Great Plains the "undefinable as-
pect of semi-aridity" that made farming a risky 
business. I I 
Settlers were attracted to the Llano 
Estacado during the teens and twenties when 
rainfall was adequate for farming. 12 Migration 
accelerated throughout the twenties. The 
Great Crash had no immediate effect on most 
farmers in the region, but the drought, dust, 
and lack of income that came in the years to 
follow were disastrous. Throughout these dif-
ficult times local people retained faith in the 
land. Each year they were certain that the rains 
would return-along with magnificent crop 
yields. While agricultural economists in Wash-
ington were recommending severe cutbacks 
in production and retirement of submarginal 
lands, Lubbock area boosters were endeavor-
ing to open up millions of acres of virgin South 
Plains land to farming. 
A. B. Davis and the Lubbock Chamber of 
Commerce were painfully aware of the diffi-
culties presented by the South Plains climate, 
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FIG. 3. Harvesting sorghum, undated. Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, 
Texas. Photo collection #61. 
but what they deemed more important was 
the potential the region had when there was 
enough rain. West Texas had few of the prob-
lems, such as Johnson grass and boll weevils, 
that plagued more humid cotton growing areas, 
and the millions of acres that surrounded Lub-
bock could easily be converted to crop land. It 
seemed irrational to the prominent Lub-
bockites to allow such land to remain unplowed 
indefinitely because of temporary droughts. 
Historian Donald Worster has suggested that 
drought is an "inevitable fact of life" of the 
semiarid Great Plains. Most Lubbockites of 
the 1930s would have agreed but, like the 
perennial optimists Worster studied in south-
west Kansas and the Oklahoma-Texas Pan-
handle region, they also believed that rain 
would inevitably return. I3 
What was needed was a means to provide 
farm income during the droughts. Davis be-
lieved the FERA rural-industrial communi-
ties plan of early February 1934 was the 
solution. To take advantage of this opportu-
nity the chamber appointed a Local Advisory 
Committee to "investigate and recommend" 
on a proposed "New Deal Colony" for the 
South Plains. The resultant plan had one pri-
mary objective-to serve as a model for large 
landowners of the region to develop their ex-
tensive unplowed holdings. 14 
The most active members of the Local 
Advisory Committee came from the trained 
and experienced faculty of recently established 
Texas Technological College. Dean A. B. 
Leidigh of the Division of Agriculture had 
grown up on a farm in Hutchison, Kansas, 
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received his graduate education from Texas 
A&M, and served as head of the USDA ex-
periment station at Amarillo during the teens. 
W. L. Stangel, head of the animal husbandry 
department, had been raised in Stangelville, 
Wisconsin, had a master's degree in animal 
husbandry from the University of Missouri, 
and had served on the faculty at Texas A&M 
before coming to T ech. 1s President Knapp, by 
far the most influential and involved member 
of the committee, was the son of Seaman 
Knapp, founder of the demonstration service 
of the USDA. He had been raised in Iowa, 
educated at Vanderbilt University, and had 
gained his experience running a plantation in 
Louisiana. Before becoming Tech's second 
president, Knapp had served on the faculty at 
Alabama Polytechnic College (now Auburn 
University) and Oklahoma A&M.16 More im-
portant than Knapp's experience, however, 
was his position as chairman of the board of 
directors for Texas Rural Communities. Other 
members of the committee included agricul-
turalists Don L. Jones, administrator of Texas 
A&M's Lubbock experiment station, and P.T. 
Monfort, Lubbock County extension agent. 
From the business s~ctor came S. A. Wells, a 
prominent area merchant, and Judge R. C. 
Hopping, author and real estate manager for 
Ellwood Farms, Incorporated, the company 
responsible for colonizing the mammoth Spade 
Ranch. Finally, there was A. B. Davis, who 
was described as "a ring tail tooter and a driver 
who could cuss louder than any man twice 
his size." The chamber manager played an in-
valuable role in relations with the public, the 
press, and state and federal officialsY 
The committee members and the chamber 
of commerce were convinced that Lubbock 
would benefit greatly from a successful, highly 
publicized federal project in the region. The 
committee submitted a twenty-five page ap-
plication to Texas Rural Communities, out-
lining their plans for a project and advertising 
the benefits of farming in the Lubbock area. 
The project would take one hundred families 
"permanently out of the industrial channels 
of the towns and cities and return them to 
farm life." Committee members even hoped: 
the government would extend the program, 
such extension being unlimited because of 
the five million acres of fine, fertile, till-
able agricultural land yet to go under the 
plow on the South Plains [and that} the 
large landowners of the section might be 
induced to follow suit, thus more inten-
sively developing the section. IS 
Dr. Knapp's position on the Texas Rural Com-
munities board of directors probably guaran-
teed acceptance of the committee's application. 
It was officially approved before the end Feb-
ruary 1934.19 
The Chamber of Commerce hoped a suc-
cessful resettlement project would achieve 
three goals. First, it would be a living ad-
vertisement of the benefits' of farm settlement 
on the South Plains and a working demon-
stration of the quality of the region's only 
natural resource-land. Second, it would show 
large landowners of the region how to colo-
nize their own holdings, attracting new set-
tlers, thus increasing the tax base and greatly 
improving business. zo Last and most impor-
tant, the members of the committee hoped 
the labor pool a large community of small farm-
ers might provide would attract industry to 
the region. 21 
The committee's plan was a modification 
ofFERA's rural-industrial communities. FERA 
settlers were to receive small plots of land for 
subsistence farming and earn wages on 
large-scale cooperative farms and community 
industries.zz The committee members felt that 
such a plan was "too communistic" and deter-
mined that each family should receive forty 
acres to grow vegetables for the family, feed 
for livestock, and cotton as a cash crop for 
income beyond that provided by the project's 
industrial enterpriseY The committee had 
several locations in mind, but selected a 4000 
acre site near the town of Ropesville, on the 
Spade Ranch lands in neighboring Hockley 
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FIG. 4. Charlie Ward (project client) in front of his homestead, 1938. Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas 
Tech University, Lubbock, Texas. Photo Collection #61. 
County, because Lubbock County was near-
ing the cotton quota set by the Bankhead 
Cotton Control Act of 1934.24 The location, 
however, was one of very few decisions made 
by the committee that was included in the 
project's final design. The committee's plan, 
never fully endorsed by FERA officials, was 
eliminated from consideration when the RA 
took control of the FERA projects on 1 May 
1935.25 
FORTY ACRES, DUST BOWL, AND THE 
CASE OF FARMER A. JUDD 
Walter Prescott Webb concluded that the 
story of white settlement west of the Cross 
Timbers was one of environmental conquest. 
Webb believed that those settlers who crossed 
the ninety-eighth meridian conquered their 
new environment and adapted it to settlement 
with inventions such as barbed wire, wind-
mills, and six-shooters. These adaptations in-
cluded larger farms and implements designed 
to conserve the limited precipitation of the 
Great Plains. Webb asserted that farming the 
Plains required "big machines, strong horse-
power, and rapid work. This means that farm-
ing in the Great Plains is done on a much 
larger scale than elsewhere, not because the 
West wants to be different, but because it must 
if it is to have any measure of prosperity."26 
Although the average annual rainfall in 
Lubbock often fell below the twenty inches 
per year necessary for general dry-farming pur-
poses, the Local Advisory Committee was re-
luctant to admit that Webb's adaptations were 
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FIG. 5. Clearing land on the Project (WPA labor), 1936. Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas Tech 
University, Lubbock, Texas. Photo Collection #61. 
necessary. Their reluctance was not derived 
from ignorance or a stubborn devotion to farm-
ing methods developed over centuries in more 
hospitable climates. To admit that the South 
Plains required extreme adaptations would 
have been tantamount to admitting that their 
Ropesville Plans were impractical. 
To promote the project locally, A. B. Davis 
scheduled speaking engagements at local civic 
clubs such as Rotary and Kiwanis throughout 
February and March of 1934. Lubbockites ap-
plauded the idea of a farm project, and the 
Local Advisory Committee's plan was largely 
accepted except for the size of the individual 
farm units. As Davis explained, 
Our plan calls for forty acres ... Instead of 
having one family on 160 acres, if we have 
four families on 160 acres, each of them 
making a better living, thereby having a 
higher plane of living than the average fam-
ily has on 160 acres, business will be mul-
tiplied four times as a result of this 
demonstration. 27 
The increase in business that Davis hoped 
would result from the Ropesville demonstra-
tion obviously appealed to Lubbock mer-
chants, but he did not clarify how a smaller 
acreage would place project farmers on "a 
higher plane of living." He did not inform 
his audiences of the FERA's rural-industrial 
concept or the committee's modification of 
it into a balance between community indus-
try and independent farming. Davis instead 
provided the cost and production records of 
a local vegetable farmer named A. Judd, in-
cluded in the committee's application to the 
FERA, to demonstrate how small farming 
might be practiced profitably in the region.2s 
When Garnet Reeves, publicity manager 
for the Lubbock Chamber of Commerce, in-
terviewed Mr. Judd during February 1934, Judd 
reported that his 1933 net income from just 
fifteen acres of vegetables was more than 
$2300, or approximately $150 per acre.29 The 
committee estimated that project farmers 
could earn up to $259 per acre from vegetables, 
an estimate Davis deemed conservative.30 Ad-
mitting that the regional market could only 
support a limited number of vegetable farm-
ers, the committee determined that only three 
acres could be planted in vegetables per project 
unit, which would provide approximately $ 777 
per year ($259 per acre) in income. Twenty 
acres would be planted in cotton, which, they 
estimated, would provide another $500 per 
year. The balance of the forty acres would be 
planted in feed for livestockY Although Davis 
used Judd's farm as an example of how small, 
diversified farming could succeed, a signifi-
cant part of Judd's interview with Reeves was 
omitted from the committee's application to 
the Texas Rural Communities and Davis's talk 
to Lubbock civic clubs. The success of Judd's 
fifteen acres of vegetables was insured by a 
$2000 irrigation unit capable of pumping 600 
gallons of water per minute from an eighty-four 
foot well, a technological innovation on the 
South Plains.32 
The committee's report implies that Judd 
was indebted to nothing more than the be-
nevolence of the South Plains soil for his suc-
cess. Irrigation, like larger acreages, was an 
adaptation peculiar to arid and semiarid re-
gions, and to admit that such an adaptation 
was necessary, or even beneficial, would have 
meant that South Plains rainfall was unsuit-
able for small-scale farming, so the commit-
tee consistently opposed irrigation. Some of 
their objections were reasonable. They sug-
gested that an "irrigated undertaking" would 
fail because one hundred families with enough 
experience to farm successfully with irriga-
tion could not be found on the South Plains. 
The availability of ground water in quanti-
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ties necessary for irrigation was uncertain in 
the 1930s and committee members feared re-
duction of the ground water supplyY Less rea-
sonably, however, the committee members 
argued that mechanized irrigation was simply 
unnecessary. In the committee's original ap-
plication to Texas Rural Communities, they 
asserted that "no irrigation is needed for gen-
eral farming on the South Plains," but sug-
gested that abundant water was available to 
project families wanting to irrigate gardens 
from windmills.34 
Unlike tl;le Lubbock Local Advisory Com-
mittee, officials of the Plainview Chamber of 
Commerce believed that a federally funded 
resettlement project was the ideal way to dem-
onstrate the practicability and profitability of 
farming with mechanized irrigation on the 
South Plains. In 1935 the Plainview Chamber 
submitted an application that was virtually 
identical to Lubbock's with one significant 
difference-the Plainview project was based 
on the use of mechanized irrigation. Accord-
ing to the Plainview application, "it has been 
proven time and time again in this section 
that average and even large families can make 
a good living, school their children, and have 
virtually all the modern conveniences, on an 
irrigated tract of forty acres."35 In Plainview, 
an area one civic booster labeled the "land of 
the underground rain," irrigation was consid-
ered a positive and progressive way to protect 
crops from drought, keep down blowing dirt, 
and cultivate the millions of unplowed acres 
on the South Plains. The Lubbock commit-
tee, on the other had, felt that insufficient 
rainfall was a greater liability than irrigation 
was a benefit. 
Whether or not state and federal officials 
saw through the use ofJudd's cost and produc-
tion estimates, the committee's size limitations 
were quickly eliminated as plans for the project 
advanced through 1934 and 1935. That the 
plans were accepted at all was probably more 
a result of Knapp's position as chairman of 
the Texas Rural Communities Board of Di-
rectors than any confidence federal officials 
had in their success. The committee offered a 
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compromise of sixty acres per unit, but federal 
officials felt that the plan was not well suited 
to the South Plains climate. The extra income 
the committee members hoped the settlers 
would earn from growing vegetables was elimi-
nated from the project's design when Adam 
R. Johnson, Texas Rural Communities man-
ager and author of the state report to the FERA 
concerning the Ropesville Project, wrote that 
the "comparatively short growing season and 
the climatic conditions together with the op-
portunity for specialized cropping make [the 
South Plainslless adaptable to diversified ag-
riculture than most places."36 
After the Resettlement Administration 
(RA) took over the project in May 1935, state 
and local agencies involved with projects pro-
gressively losttheir authority. In August 1935, 
W. B. Orr, assistant manager of the Texas Rural 
Communities, reported to the Local Advisory 
Committee that the RA had determined that 
each unit should be 120 acres. Davis reported 
this change to farm reporter Victor Schoffel-
mayer, who published the committee's com-
plaints in the Dallas Morning News and later in 
a collection of essays entitled The South Plains 
of Texas Historic"al Sketches. According to 
Schoffelmayer the RA's decision on farm unit 
sizes brought a "storm of protest" from the 
Local Advisory Committee, the type of pro-
test "peculiar to Plainsmen when they feel their 
section is misunderstood."37 The committee 
primarily objected to the increase in unit size 
to 120 acres. Davis complained, 
a large number of units of approximately 
sixty acres each will enable a farmer to make 
a better living than the large average now 
makes on 160 acres .... Hell, any and ev-
erybody who knows anything about this 
country knows that any intelligent farmer, 
properly started out and capitalized, can 
make a good living on 120 acres on the 
South Plains of Texas.38 
Once again, Davis did not clarify how families 
were going to make more on less acreage. Nei-
ther Davis' letter nor Schoffelmayer's article 
made specific mention of the decentralized 
rural factories that were the ultimate goal of 
the members of the Local Advisory Commit-
tee. Davis concluded that the original pur-
poses of the project, to demonstrate the 
benefits of settlement on the South Plains and 
to stimulate regional development through in-
tensive land colonization, were "completely 
lost under the 120 acre plan."39 Despite objec-
tions, the Ropesville Project's final plans in-
cluded 120 acre limits. When the first 
thirty-three families moved on to the project 
in January of 1936, some of the homes had to 
be disassembled and moved to accommodate 
the final unit size of an average of 165 culti-
vable acres. 40 The committee members, like 
many other local officials throughout the 
country, blamed RA administrator R. G. 
Tugwel1.41 
Throughout his career, Tugwell was criti-
cized for his outspoken and left-leaning eco-
nomic philosophy. The RA did not follow the 
committee's plan because Tugwell felt the 
rural-industrial communities concept was 
flawed. Although Roosevelt had assigned the 
Division of Subsistence Homesteads and the 
FERA's Rural Rehabilitation Division to the 
RA in 1935, Tugwell considered them a bur-
densome liability, impractical programs forced 
on the RA for the sake of administrative effi-
ciencyY Tugwell did not believe that indus-
try could be lured into rural areas. While 
programs could keep some farmers on the land 
and help to alleviate rural poverty, most of 
the displaced poor would be forced to move to 
the cities. As he said in 1935, "we must be 
prepared to absorb very large numbers of per-
sons from farms into our general industrial and 
urban life ... subsistence homestead projects 
will function merely as eddies of retreat for 
exceptional persons."43 
The practicability of the committee's plan 
was cast into doubt by the voluminous re-
search conducted by New Deal agencies, the 
Department of Agriculture, and the Depart-
ment of the Interior following the drought 
emergency on the Great Plains in the 1930s. 
This research was summarized in a 1936 report 
by the president's Great Plains Committee, 
prominent officials from seven federal agen-
cies. This report, The Future of the Great Plains, 
concluded that "unless there was a permanent 
change in the agricultural pattern on the 
Plains, relief always would have to be extended 
whenever the available rainfall was deficient." 
The committee concluded that unwise agri-
cultural practices on the Great Plains were 
responsible for the severe wind erosion and 
land deterioration of the Dust Bowl period, 
but "careful planning [and] fewer and larger 
farms on scientifically selected sites" would 
help to restore the land to provide a comfort-
able and consistent living for a limited num-
ber of farmers and ranchers. Farm sizes would 
have to increase and the number of farms to 
decrease.44 The practical experience of men 
involved with the Ropesville Project con-
firmed the findings of the Great Plains Com-
mittee. For example, C. P. Blackwell, Assistant 
Regional Director of the Land Utilization Di-
vision of the RA, who owned more than a 
half-section of land on the South Plains, in-
formed Davis in December of 1935 that "with 
thirty years of farming experience in that sec-
tion to my credit, I would have to discount 
many of your calculations because I own a 
farm of 330 acres which has not produced 
enough in the past five years to pay the 
taxes."45 
Although the extended drought decimated 
the South Plains agricultural economy, the 
committee insisted that the drought and the 
dust storms were temporary inconveniences 
and that rain would inevitably return. They 
were aware of the problems landowners like 
Blackwell were having but they, particularly 
A. B. Davis, were consistently optimistic about 
the future of the South Plains. Davis's protest 
of the Federal Land Bank appraisal in March 
1935 reveals his optimism. The appraiser in-
cluded the Lubbock area in the "extended 1934 
drouth [sic] area" but Davis insisted to offi-
cials of the FERA and later to the RA that this 
was misleading. Including the information 
about low rainfall was unfair because the 
"drought of 1934 was not confined to this area. 
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It was nation wide, in fact, it was world wide. 
No one knows what the future will be."46 
Donald Worster has characterized the Dust 
Bowl as a region that had borders as "inexact 
and shifting as a sand-dune." Whether or not 
the South Plains area can be included in what 
became known as the Dust Bowl is uncertain. 
Lubbock was on the southern fringe of the 
area the SCS defined as having suffered from 
"severe wind erosion" between 1935 and 
1938.47 Whether or not the region could be 
considered part of the Dust Bowl was a matter 
of perspective. Most farmers in the region prob-
ably thought the label accurate. Maureen 
Condra and her son Frank, residents of the 
Ropesville Project, recalled a midday duster 
in 1938 that filled their house with dust so 
thick and black they were blinded beyond an 
arm's length. To protect her children from 
suffocating, Mrs. Condra placed wet rags over 
their noses while they slept. Lillian Willis re-
called her husband going out on horseback to 
roundup livestock after a storm had drifted 
dust dunes over the fences on land northwest 
of Lubbock now owned by Texas Tech Uni-
versity. Viedna Darby recalled her husband 
getting lost on the way back from the out-
house, blinded by the blowing dirt. 48 While 
storms like this frequented the Lubbock area 
throughout the 1930s, the Local Advisory 
Committee made every effort to disassociate 
the South Plains from the Dust Bowl label. 
In an effort to "stay out of the Dust Bowl," 
the committee initiated another "storm of pro-
test" when RA officials decided to transfer the 
Ropesville Project to RA Region Twelve, with 
headquarters in Amarillo, from Region Eight, 
which was headquartered in Dallas. 49 The 
c·ommittee felt that Region Twelve was asso-
ciated with the Dust Bowl while farms and 
crops around Lubbock were completely dif-
ferent. R. P. Trent, administrator of Region 
Eight, informed Tugwell that the Local Ad-
visory Committee felt the appropriate divid-
ing line between Regions Eight and Twelve 
should extend from the southwest corner of 
Oklahoma along the northern boundaries of 
those counties immediately north of Lubbock 
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because "the country south of the line is not 
seriously affected by wind erosion, dust storms, 
etc., and is not characteristic of the rest of the 
dust bowl."50 The original boundary remained, 
down the length of the ninety-eighth merid-
ian and west along the southern edge of the 
Llano Estacado. The decision to transfer 
Ropesville to Region Twelve was probably 
made for administrative efficiency, since 
Amarillo was a little more than two hours drive 
away while Dallas was about six. Then there 
was the fact that L. H. Hauter, director of the 
Amarillo office of the RA, had visited Lub-
bock in April of 1936 during a dust storm, a 
common occurrence in Lubbock during the 
spring time. This particular storm, according 
to Garnet Reeves, hit Lubbock like a "slap in 
the face"-as did Hauter's speech. He began 
his talk by saying sarcastically, as Reeves noted, 
that he was "glad to come down here to Lub-
bock where you don't have any dust."51 The 
project was transferred to Region Eight effec-
tive 1 October 1936.52 
The local advisory committee was aware of 
how harsh the South Plains climate could be, 
but they refused to concede that dust storms 
and drought were anything more than tempo-
rary inconveniences. Otherwise their plans 
were impractical, and to them the Ropesville 
Project was not a relief measure but an adver-
tisement for the benefits of farm settlement 
on the South Plains. Drought and dust were 
not incentives for settlers, and the commit-
tee, believing in the regenerative powers of 
the land, were exasperated by the opinion of 
RA officials. As A. B. Davis informed the 
members of the Local Advisory Committee, "I 
still have some hopes of our doing something 
with the Ropesville Project [but] ... all too 
many of those in authority just don't believe 
in this country. They speak of it as being a 
country of 'low rainfall.' They just can't get it 
out of their heads that this is not a desert."53 
"STRICTLY INDIGENOUS AMERICAN LINES" 
The Lubbock Chamber of Commerce did 
not wish to consider any negative aspects of 
the South Plains climate nor any political, 
social, or economic issues that prospective 
settlers, land owners, or industrial investors 
could construe as negative. Committee mem-
bers believed the Ropesville Project could 
begin to revolutionize agriculture on the South 
Plains, but they endeavored not to deviate 
from traditional, conservative American 
norms or to allow federal officials to do so. 
The committee members sought to disassoci-
ate the project from the economic left and to 
limit project costs, so as to avoid the negative 
attention other community projects were re-
ceiving for excessive spending. 
Much of the support for the Ropesville 
Project came from Colonel Lawrence West-
brook, the original administrator of the FERA 
in Texas and later assistant administrator of 
the agency under Harry Hopkins. Westbrook 
wanted the FERA rural resettlement commu-
nities to resemble the communal villages es-
tablished in the United States by Northern 
European immigrants. He believed these im-
migrant communities had "almost invariably 
... managed to get by without having to go on 
relief" because the members cooperated. 54 The 
FERA plan called for a small subsistence plot 
for each family combined with wage work on 
large communal farms and in cooperative in-
dustrial enterprises. 55 Unlike "crackpot eco-
nomic or social panaceas," FERA communities 
were to make families "self sustaining by an 
investment in equipment and supplies which 
would not exceed the cost of extending relief 
over a period of several months."56 
Westbrook's ideas about communal village 
life and cooperative farming carried the leftist 
tinge the committee wanted to avoid. As Davis 
wrote Victor Schoffelmayer, the members of 
the committee "just did not believe the com-
munity or cooperative thing would work with 
worthwhile Americans-it was too commu-
nistic."57 Davis insisted on not being quoted, 
but Schoffelmayer agreed with him, stating 
that Ropesville was to "be operated on strictly 
indigenous American lines, provided that the 
federal planning administration will incorpo-
rate some of the advice of the South Plains 
special committee."58 Individual family farms, 
not cooperative farms or subsistence home-
steads, were what the committee sought for 
the "young, pioneer, independent stock" that 
would be moving into the farmsteads at 
Ropesville.59 
Because of the "communistic" implications 
of cooperative or communal projects, most 
New Deal communities, including Ropesville, 
were designed from the beginning for indi-
vidual family farms. Only four farm communi-
ties operated by the RA and its successor the 
Farm Security Administration (FSA) might 
have been appropriately labeled cooperative 
or communal, in that each farmer had a small 
subsistence plot and the community as a whole 
worked a large commercial plot. These four, 
however, received much attention from re-
porters and congressmen dismayed by the 
possibility of leftist "encroachments."6o 
In Texas, the target for anti-leftist suspicions 
was the Woodlake Community near Houston, 
which seemed to represent all that was "un-
American" about the New Deal community 
program. Writing for The Farmer Stockman 
Clarence Roberts suggested that Woodlake 
ruined the lives of men and their families be-
cause the good houses and steady work were 
not worth the embarrassment of "complete 
dependence on the government."61 Several 
Ropesville committee members visited the 
Woodlake Project, but according to Davis it 
was the antithesis of what they wanted to ac-
complish on the South Plains.62 
The Ropesville committee also wanted to 
avoid Woodlake's high costs and demonstrate 
how inexpensive farm settlement on the South 
Plains could be. When the March 1935 "Ap-
plication for Approval" to the FERA for the 
Ropesville Project showed little resemblance 
to the committee's plan, the Chamber of Com-
merce forwarded a copy to Dean Leidigh of 
the Division of Agriculture at Texas Tech. 
Leidigh scribbled corrections in the margins 
and slashed through figures and tables in a 
bold, impatient cursive. Underneath the total 
estimate of $4886.07 for land and homes 
Leidigh wrote "too damn much!" In the mar-
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gin beside the itemized list of construction, 
implement, livestock, and startup costs he 
wrote "change all this." The dean slashed all 
the estimates, except the cost of land and 
barns, reducing the total cost for beginning 
operations, including land, construction, live-
stock, and implements, from $5769 to $4411 
per unit. 63 
These cost reductions brought praise from 
the Texas Rural Communities Board of Direc-
tors. Dr. R. Benedict, president of the corpo-
ration, suggested that the committee was 
"entitled to gold buttons" for their endeav-
orS.64 Carl Lovelace, a very strong adherent of 
the Ropesville Project on the Texas Rural 
Communities Board of Advisors, said: 
It seems to me we have a very unique situ-
ation here, this is the only time the com-
munity has ever evinced any interest after 
the land was sold .... They are putting 
their knowledge and experience into [the 
Ropesville Projectl-they are not asking us 
to spend more-they are asking us to spend 
less.65 
To the committee members, particularly 
Knapp, the facilities that were to equip most 
New Deal communities offended the West 
Texas pioneer spirit. Conveniences like in-
door plumbing and electricity would deprive 
the settlers of the pioneering experience of 
most other West Texans. Knapp claimed, "I 
am not ashamed to admit that I did not have 
a bathroom until long after I was married. I am 
willing to bet that nine-tenths of the people 
in that country don't have them." He contin-
ued that West Texas settlers had "gone out 
there into dugouts and made their way ... 
That's the thing I feel that we should remem-
ber. I don't think we should wire these houses 
at all, I wouldn't think of wiring them."66 
Sumner A. Wells agreed with Knapp, stating 
that placing government clients "on a plane 
of living-with a home and improvements 
and so forth-far above the farm owning citi-
zens of the section" was fundamentally wrong 
and was bound to cause "friction" with their 
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neighborsY Lovelace agreed with Knapp, be-
lieving that the best plan was the one first 
introduced by the Local Advisory Commit-
tee: "forty acres and the ordinary conveniences 
they are used to ... furnish them with bath-
tubs, electric lights and a lot of other things 
they are not used to and they will never be 
able to pull out." Lovelace suggested that a 
pioneering experience would have an im-
measurable benefit: 
I know a little about that country out there. 
You go out there and see people living in 
dugouts with probably the whole improve-
ments not worth more than two hundred 
dollars, and then go back in three or four 
years, and they have a nice house. There is 
something very beautiful about it.68 
Providing farmers with a higher standard 
of living was, however, along with reducing 
tenancy and improving land utilization, one 
of the fundamental objectives of the New 
Deal's rural rehabilitation program. Franklin 
Roosevelt declared in 1934 that New Deal 
rural rehabilitation would make "country life 
every bit as desirable as city life" by providing 
rural people with the "necessary advantages 
which exist in the cities."69 New Dealers found 
nothing beautiful about American farm fami-
lies living for three or four years in sod dug-
outs with no plumbing or electricity. Such a 
lifestyle was cold, dark, and unsanitary. The 
RA was designed to relieve rural poverty and, 
to New Dealers, life in a dugout without run-
ning water or electric light was poverty-not 
pioneering. The homes were built with in-
door sinks and a tub, and they were wired by 
the Rural Electrification Administration in 
1939.70 
The committee insisted that the Ropesville 
Project follow "indigenous American lines" 
because high costs and "communistic" experi-
ments were unpopular in Texas in the 1930s. 
They tried to rid the Ropesville Project of 
whatever might attract negative publicity and 
disassociated themselves and Lubbock from 
the project where it drifted away from the lines 
they drew. As A. B. Davis told Frank P. Hol-
land, editor of Farm and Ranch, "very frankly, 
we may want [a story] for propaganda pur-
poses-and then again, depending on certain 
developments, we may not want a story at all. "71 
The Chamber had initiated the Ropesville 
Project to inspire large land owners to colo-
nize their own holdings, to attract new settle-
ment by advertising the capabilities of the 
South Plains soil, and to create a contented 
labor pool of small farmers that would bring 
industry to the region. The project was sup-
posed to demonstrate a new, efficient way of 
life on the South Plains. 
"A CITY, EXTENDING IN EVERY DIREC-
TION, AND YET IT Is NOT A CITY" 
The Local Advisory Committee and the 
Lubbock Chamber of Commerce hoped to fill 
the South Plains with thousands of families 
on small farms. Although they understood it 
would be difficult for a family to subsist on 
forty or sixty acres of land, committee mem-
bers were not concerned with making the farms 
on the Ropesville Project consistently profit-
able because they were confident that indus-
try would provide the settlers a steady cash 
income. Once the Slaughters, Ellwoods, and 
other large ranchers of the region began to 
colonize their lands in a similar manner,the 
committee members believed the large popu-
lation of small farmers would attract industry 
to the region. The settlers could find wage 
work in decentralized rural factories, enjoy the 
benefits of a rural lifestyle, and be able to feed 
their families when economic downturns came 
to the factories. Such industrial development 
had some support beyond the committee, as 
Davis told S. A. Wells in 1935: "very very 
confidentially, the State Planning Board has 
experts studying the possibilities of a woolen 
mill of some kind in connection with a colony 
of something like 1000 families to be built 
around the present Ropesville Colony."72 
This "woolen mill" was to be the first of 
many rural factories that committee members 
hoped would one day dot the landscape of the 
South Plains from Plainview to Big Spring and 
from Clovis to the Cap rock. Bradford Knapp 
wrote an article in 1934 for the fiftieth anni-
versary edition of the San Angelo Standard 
Times prophesying what life might be like in 
West Texas in 1984. When he woke from his 
imaginary fifty--year nap, he found six million 
more people, cars that looked like "animated 
turtles," highways without accidents, and 
noiseless airplanes. To his surprise Knapp 
found, spread out across the Llano Estacado, 
"a city, extending in every direction, and yet 
it is not a city." It was comprised of "great 
groups of smaHfarms with factories in the cen-
ter." These "factories out in the country [had] 
beautiful cottages all around them [with] beau-
tiful curved roads and every house has its gar-
den, its own poultry, and anywhere from three 
to five or six acres to support the family." 
Knapp was "amazed at the vegetation" and 
discovered that "tree conscious" W est Texans 
had altered their climate by planting rows of 
trees in between fields to control the "blowing 
of soils." EquaHy "water conscious" people had 
dammed rivers "until the succession of lakes 
has almost the appearance of a string of pearls, 
glittering in the sunlight along every canyon 
and every stream." Industry had become the 
lifeblood of West Texas and "only finished 
products are exported" from the region, fea-
turing "beautiful fabric of wool, cotton, and 
mohair or in new and interesting combina-
tions." Knapp's 1984 was the new way of life 
he and the Local Advisory Committee hoped 
to begin with the Ropesville Project. 73 Knapp 
hoped for a life onthe land that was planned 
and rational, that included the benefits of the 
modern industrial world without sacrificing 
the rural lifestyle-and that was very different 
from the agricultural complex that developed 
around Lubbock after World War II. 
The possibility of a community like that 
envisioned by Knapp was eliminated when the 
RA took charge of the project in April 1935. 
Once it became apparent that Tugwell's RA 
"sang low on industrial development," Knapp 
and the members of the committee admitted 
that an increase in unit size was necessary if 
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the farms were going to be profitable. Knapp 
wrote Davis on 30 December 1935, two days 
before the first settlers moved in, that "when 
we began this project it was rather definitely 
understood that the small size of the farms 
would have to be supplemented by some sort 
of a community manufacturing enterprise." 
Since the RA was unwilling to support such 
an enterprise "the only way to increase the 
certainty of each farm paying out was to in-
crease its size." In fact, Knapp suggested that 
the biggest asset for farmers in the South Plains 
was "the fact that one man with team and 
tools can handle more land than in other sec-
tions."74 
It became apparent that the committee was 
no longer involved with the administration of 
the project when the RA hired R. D. Jones as 
the first community manager. The committee 
had asked in June of 1935 to accept applica-
tions for the position, had sifted through one 
hundred applicants, interviewed several and 
had narrowed the field down to three when 
the RA sent word that they had already ap-
pointed Jones. The Baylor alumnus with some 
graduate credits from Yale had been elimi-
nated by the committee early on in the pro-
cess. 75 By the time the first thirty-three 
families moved on to the project in January 
1936, the committee members were "practi-
cally out of the picture as far as directing the 
policies in connection with [Ropesville] is 
concerned. "76 
Several members of the committee prepared 
to resign after the first families moved in. They 
were certain the project would fail and, as com-
mittee member Don Jones put it, if it should 
'''fall flat' this country would be condemned as 
far as its agricultural possibilities are con-
cerned." Some of the members hoped the gov-
ernment might expand the number of units 
on the project but Spencer Wells would have 
won when he offered to "make you a three to 
one bet you never get 100 units." When the 
settlers bought out the project in 1943 there 
were only seventy-six units. Only Bradford 
Knapp continued to support the project, regu-
larly visiting the settlers and writing letters to 
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government officials on their behalf until his 
death in 1938. Knapp was disappointed that 
the Ropesville Project would not include in-
dustry but was "entirely in favor" of many of 
the aims of the RA-particularly its efforts to 
stop farm tenancy.77 He believed that funda-
mental changes were necessary in the eco-
nomic and social structures of rural America 
and that government intervention and regu-
lation were necessary so that the "rights of all 
will be protected and preserved" from "the 
glorification of the individual." He also felt 
that projects like Ropesville were steps to-
ward the "great and overpowering demand-
the common good."78 As he wrote Rexford 
Tugwell in 1936, "I think that the kind of 
thing that has been attempted at Ropesville 
could be made the means of converting a large 
proportion of the tenants in the South, both 
white and Negro, into self-respecting land-
owners."79 
Self respect was at the foundation of the 
committee's plans for Ropesville. All were 
educated men who were aware that farms, par-
ticularly in the South Plains, were growing 
larger and fewer. Like New Dealers they were 
shocked by the suffering of the Great Depres-
sion and their rural backgrounds led them to 
conclude that solutions could be found on 
the land. Land ownership provided families 
with self respect and a sense of independence 
that wage labor never could. The committee 
members believed that Texans, especially the 
"young pioneer stock" of the South Plains, 
needed only a decent house and a tract of 
fertile soil to lead a satisfying life.8o 
"THE MOST PRACTICAL RESETTLEMENT 
PROJECT IN THE NATION" 
Even after Tugwell resigned in 1936 and 
his Resettlement Administration was replaced 
by the Farm Security Administration in 1937, 
the New Deal's community projects remained 
controversial, as the Local Advisory Commit-
tee had feared, because they were expensive 
and were thought to be "communistic." De-
spite these fears, the Ropesville Project at-
tracted little of the negative attention directed 
at the New Deal community building program 
as a whole. Government officials, journalists, 
historians, and the settlers themselves judged 
the project a success. Its practical design, the 
long term economic benefits it brought to its 
settlers, the ability of most settlers to pay their 
government loans before they were due, and 
the help it provided the seventy-six families 
of more than three hundred individuals who 
settled on the project all help account for its 
success. 
Marion Clawson presented the most objec-
tive account of Ropesville, comparing it with 
eight other FSA projects in January 1943. 
Ropesville compared well in every category 
to four other individually operated farm 
projects and four cooperatives. Its unit cost of 
$8431 was third lowest. Ropesville Project 
farmers' delinquency rate on loans was very 
low, just 22 percent compared to 86 percent 
on Wichita Valley Farms and 88 percent on 
Osage farms in Missouri. Turnover rates were 
also very low; only fourteen families left 
Ropesville between 1939 and 1943, while most 
of the other projects lost about one third of 
their families during the four year period. The 
nearby ninety-unit Wichita Valley Project, 
for example, lost thirty-four families between 
1939 and 1943. By 1940, Ropesville was the 
only project that had a positive net return, 
$1814. The other projects had negative bal-
ances from $913 to $32,217.81 . 
Hearing that Eleanor Roosevelt might visit 
Lubbock,· Ropesville residents invited her to 
visit "the most practical resettlement project 
in the nation."82 The Ropesville Project main-
tained a reputation of practicality throughout 
its history with the FSA (1936-43). Wes Izzard, 
writer for the South Plains Farmer, suggested 
that the "benevolent supervision" with which 
the community manager and his staff adminis-
tered the Ropesville Project was a "practical 
rather than a brain trust management." It was 
"emphatically not a cooperative scheme, with 
the work and profits shared, that had been 
tried on other projects with conspicuous lack 
of success."83 
The FSA's "benevolent supervision" may 
have contributed to the Ropesville Project's 
financial success, but all New Deal commu-
nity projects were subject to the same supervi-
sion and most were considered failures. Many 
FSA clients, even on successful projects like 
Ropesville, resented government interference 
in their day to day lives. Project farmer]. D. 
Watts, for example, complained about FSA 
supervision in an angry letter to Congressman 
George Mahon, asking "is this an American 
way of living? ... why send our boys to fight 
and die for us if we lose our freedom at home?" 
Watts suggested that the government should 
"eliminate a half dozen officials or all of them 
and [treat] us like we were white American 
people. Without a complete record of every-
thing we do we could go on with our farming 
and other duties with the peace of mind that 
comes from living in a free country."84 In an-
other letter Mrs. L. S. Rosser echoed Watts, 
adding: 
to have four to six people trying to promote 
this and that, drawing a nice salary which is 
paid for by every taxpayer in the U.S., seems 
to be uncalled for ... why have a group of 
people all the time examining [us] and us-
ing us to experiment on ... Consider us as 
a human being and not as a guinea Pig. 85 
Most FSA community projects were de-
signed to resettle families on individual farms, 
so Ropesville's not being a "cooperative 
scheme" was not unusual and cannot account 
for its success.86 Most FSA community projects 
failed because the individual farms were too 
small to be profitable and land prices were too 
high for the farmers to purchase them.87 Most 
settlers on FSA projects left when they were 
able to purchase other farms or when wage 
work became plentiful during the war. The 
Ropesville Project succeeded in the long run 
because land prices were low in the South 
Plains. The settlers' original agreement offered 
them the eventual opportunity to purchase 
their farms. Land values were low and the 165 
acre plots were large enough to turn a profit, 
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so the Ropesville settlers very wisely stayed on 
their farms while their counterparts on other 
projects were leaving in droves.88 When the 
FSA offered purchase contracts in 1943, all 
but seven families purchased their farms. 89 
They paid about $6000 each for their farm-
steads, or approximately $31.40 per acre, while 
the price of land on most other projects was 
much higher.90 At Osage Farms in Missouri, 
for example, land values were more than $50 
per acre four years before the FSA began offer-
ing purchase contracts to settlers.91 Even with 
the strong markets and high prices brought by 
World War II, Ropesville farmers probably 
would not have been able to afford such a 
purchase. 
The project's final design was only practi-
cal, however, when there was sufficient rain-
fall. In 1940 Acting Regional Director Wilson 
Cowen reported to FSA administrator C. B. 
Baldwin that crop yield estimates on the 
Ropesville Project were "entirely too optimis-
tic" because they were based on wet years. 
Ropesville's impracticality in a dry year is il-
lustrated by comparison with the New Mexico 
Farms Project in Fort Sumner. Although net 
income on the projects in 1939 was similar, 
$752.93 for New Mexico and $689.51 for 
Ropesville, farmers on Ropesville received 
$789.42 in direct government payments and 
FSA loans while those on New Mexico Farms 
received just $315.63. Farmers in Fort Sumner, 
a similar climate, needed less aid because their 
crops were irrigated.92 
The widespread use of mechanized irriga-
tion systems, capable of drawing 800 gallons 
per minute from the Ogallala Aquifer, did not 
come to the South Plains until the post-war 
period. Project farmers were able to convert 
to irrigation earlier than their neighbors be-
cause they were able to build equity as land 
values rose rapidly on the South Plains after 
the end of the war. Of twenty-six project fami-
lies traced through the records of the Hockley 
County Courthouse, half had taken out mate-
rials and mechanic's liens on their property to 
install pumping plants prior to 1949. Eight of 
the other thirteen families had already sold 
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their farms, three had pumping plants installed 
prior to 1955, and two either did not install 
irrigation systems or did not borrow to do SO.93 
Between 1945 and 1950, just 37 percent of 
Hockley County farmers had converted to ir-
rigation. The average size of these farms in 
1950 was 388.6 acres under cultivation, com-
pared to the 165 for former project farmers. 
The project farmers were good credit risks 
because the land for which they had paid $6000 
in 1943 was worth about $16,000 in 1950.94 
While their neighbors were paying off debts 
from previous decades, going into debt to buy 
land, or going out of business, project farmers 
owned their land or had relatively little debt. 
Thirty-one of seventy-six project farmers had 
paid off their loans and owned their land by 
1947.95 Besides irrigation systems, project farm-
ers were able to make further improvements 
on homes, purchase automobiles, and buy farm 
equipment like tractors and combines. The 
project farmers were one step ahead of their 
competitors as the South Plains evolved into 
the giant cotton factory it is today. In 1993, a 
half century after they were purchased, 
thirty-six of the Ropesville Project farms were 
still owned by project family members.96 
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